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Academic collaborations and firm innovation performance in China:  
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Abstract 
Although prior research has highlighted the importance of academic collaborations in 
enhancing firms’ innovation performance, it has largely focused on developed countries. As a 
result, how academic collaborations influence innovation in emerging countries, which differ 
fundamentally from developed countries in their institutional environment, remains unclear. 
We contribute to this literature by examining how collaborations with universities and research 
institutes influence the ability of Chinese emerging market enterprises (EMEs) to develop 
innovations. Our analysis challenges the assumption of institutional homogeneity within a 
given country, showing that institutions evolve in different ways across sub-national Chinese 
regions. This uneven institutional evolution affects the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs), the level of international openness, the quality of universities and research 
institutes across regions and thus the degree to which Chinese EMEs benefit from academic 
collaborations. Our findings reveal that sub-national institutional variations have a profound 
impact on the relationship between academic collaborations and firms’ innovation 
performance, illustrate that some established assumptions are not valid in emerging countries, 
such as China, and offer insights into how EMEs can enhance their innovation performance.  
 
Keywords: Academic collaborations; performance; institutions; regions; China; emerging 
countries.  
 
 2
1. Introduction 
Firms that collaborate with universities and research institutes (URIs hereafter) source 
scientific and technological knowledge that can enhance their innovation performance 
(Mindruta, 2013; Ponds et al., 2010). Prior studies have provided valuable insights indicating 
that such collaborations improve a firm’s patenting success, entry to new technological fields 
and new product development (George et al., 2002; Perkmann et al., 2011; Zucker et al., 
1998). Nevertheless, the findings and assumptions that have informed the theory on this 
subject are largely based on studies in developed (Western) countries. These countries are 
characterized by mature institutions (which are largely homogeneous within a given economy), 
well-established innovation systems, world-class universities and strong indigenous research 
and development (R&D) capabilities. The significant ways in which emerging markets differ 
from developed economies limit scholarly understanding of the role of academic collaborations 
in enhancing the innovation performance of emerging market enterprises (EMEs) (Eom and 
Lee, 2010; Eun et al., 2006). We address this important phenomenon by focusing on one of the 
largest, most diverse and most innovative emerging countries, China. 
Chinese firms, such as Lenovo and Huawei, have improved their innovativeness and 
ability to compete against their foreign counterparts (Eun et al., 2006; Mu and Lee, 2005). 
However, although the theory for developed countries considers internal R&D to be the most 
valuable component of a firm’s innovation strategy (Teece, 1986; Zhou and Wu, 2010), many 
Chinese firms do not possess and cannot rapidly develop strong R&D capabilities (Motohashi 
and Yun, 2007; Perks et al., 2009). One means by which Chinese firms can compensate for 
their limited internal R&D capabilities is to pursue an innovation strategy that relies heavily on 
academic collaborations. In fact, whereas firms in developed countries rank universities as 
their least frequent source of information (BIS, 2012; Perkmann et al., 2011), between one-
third and half of all external R&D of Chinese EMEs focuses on academic collaborations 
(OECD, 2008; 2009). The Chinese innovation model differs from those for developed 
countries in not only its reliance on URIs but also the context in which it originates. Because 
university-industry theory is not universally valid (Howells et al., 2012), one challenge here is 
to identify how the Chinese innovation context differs from what theory about Western 
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countries assumes and predicts and to understand how such differences influence the 
effectiveness of academic collaborations in enhancing the innovation performance of EMEs. 
One key explanation for such variations is the importance of institutions, defined as the 
rules of the game (North, 1990). Institutions may facilitate or constrain collaboration by 
influencing transaction costs and the set of rules, supportive structures and resources (Phillips 
et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2012). Nevertheless, despite the centrality of this premise, the current 
theory for developed countries rests upon the assumption that institutions are homogeneous 
across different sub-national locations within a given country (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; 
Edquist, 1997), thus overlooking the role of cross-regional institutional idiosyncrasies 
(Liebeskind et al., 1996; Hong, 2008).1  Indeed, although prior research recognizes that 
innovation is fundamentally a location-specific process (Asheim and Coenen, 2005), there has 
been little research about the role of subnational region-specific institutions in facilitating or 
constraining the interactions and collaborations between various organizations (Doloreux and 
Parto, 2005).  
In this study, we argue that institutions vary significantly within emerging countries, such 
as China (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), and propose that such institutional variations determine 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs), the level of international openness 
across regions, the research quality of URIs and thus the effectiveness of academic 
collaborations in enhancing the innovativeness of Chinese EMEs. Cross-regional institutional 
idiosyncrasies in IPR enforcement, international openness and the quality of academic talent in 
URIs influence the benefits and costs of academic collaborations as well as the search, 
transaction and transformation costs associated with identifying and using external knowledge 
(Whitley, 2000). Thus, such idiosyncrasies are key discriminating factors of the effects of 
academic collaboration on EMEs’ innovation performance. 
Using a sample of 375 innovative Chinese firms, we empirically confirm this premise, 
illustrating that the uneven institutional development across subnational regions within China 
influences IPR enforcement, international openness and the quality of academic talent in URIs 
                                                          
1 A notable exception is Chan et al. (2010). 
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and, consequently, affects the performance of academic collaboration. Whereas URIs and 
firms in Western countries take for granted an abundance of well-developed institutions (e.g., 
countrywide consistent and enforceable IPR laws and contractual agreements), China’s 
political and economic reform gives regional governments a large degree of authority over 
policy-making and control of legal development and enforcement (Chan et al., 2010). We 
demonstrate that the resulting within-country differences can enhance or undermine the value 
of URI-firm R&D collaborations. We also show that the relationship between academic 
collaborations and EMEs’ innovation performance is not linear and monotonic. This finding 
has implications for current thinking about the trade-offs between the development of internal 
innovative capabilities and the reliance on external academic collaborations.  
Our analysis contributes to the literature by identifying how location-specific institutional 
idiosyncrasies moderate the role of academic collaboration in enhancing EMEs’ innovation. 
By explaining why academic collaborations are likely to be more beneficial in some regions 
than in others, we establish a conceptual link between two important research strands (namely, 
academic collaboration and regional innovation systems), which have only been studied in 
isolation in previous studies. The analysis of subnational institutional idiosyncrasies is 
important because it extends prior theoretical predictions by explaining why academic 
collaborations with similar characteristics can lead to different innovation outcomes and yield 
different returns. By describing the critical role of academic collaborations, our analysis 
reveals an innovation business model of EMEs that differs considerably from that of developed 
country firms, which largely focuses on the development of internal R&D capabilities and 
relies only slightly on academic collaborations. Although our analysis in the remainder of the 
paper focuses mainly on China, a number of the predictions of our framework could be 
adapted to other emerging economies. 
 
2. Benefits and costs of academic collaborations 
One of the key characteristics of Chinese EMEs, as opposed to firms in developed 
countries, is that they only rarely possess internal R&D capabilities, and they cannot develop 
such capabilities rapidly due to time compression diseconomies (Motohashi and Yun, 2007; 
Perks et al., 2009). Hence, these firms rely significantly on university collaborations (Wang 
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and Lin, 2013). URIs enhance firm innovation through various mechanisms. First, they provide 
a pool of specialized labor that constitutes a crucial element of intellectual human capital 
(Zucker et al., 1998). Academic collaboration enables the firm to lower its search costs, 
acquire scientific talent and knowledge, and conduct joint research with universities (Cohen et 
al., 2002; Jaffe, 1989; Prahbu, 1999) that would not be possible otherwise (Romijin and 
Albaladejo, 2002). 
Second, URIs may enhance firms’ problem-solving abilities and facilitate the integration 
of external knowledge into the firm’s own processes (Fabrizio, 2006). They conduct basic and 
exploratory research that is typically expensive for firms to undertake and help firms to 
transform knowledge into commercially successful products (George et al., 2002; Zucker et al., 
1998). Furthermore, academic collaboration enables firms to develop innovative capabilities 
through interactive learning (Cohen et al., 2002). Because firms need to renew their 
capabilities on a continual basis, access to external inputs enables them to keep abreast of the 
latest technological advances and to develop new technologies (Prahbu, 1999). There are 
strong complementarities between academic research and firms’ R&D that enhance 
entrepreneurial orientation and innovation performance (George et al., 2002).  
Nevertheless, identifying, assimilating, and utilizing external knowledge comes at a cost. 
First, academic collaborations may involve coordination and monitoring problems (Mindruta, 
2013; George et al., 2002) as well as problems that arise due to the reluctance of URIs to 
become involved in business (Hershberg et al., 2007). Such problems may occur because of the 
differences in administrative systems between firms and academic institutes in terms of 
employment and funding (Bruneel et al., 2010). The sunk cost of such investments is 
particularly high in cases where the firm’s partners turn out to be unsuitable. Furthermore, 
differences in the objectives, incentives, values and cultures between URIs and firms may 
make partnerships less productive. For instance, the intellectual property rules that universities 
adopt often conflict with firms’ knowledge acquisition and protection objectives, thus creating 
transaction-related problems (Bruneel et al., 2010). Whereas academics are oriented toward 
recognition and reputation and wish to publish their discoveries, firms focus on protecting 
valuable knowledge (Fabrizio, 2006). 
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Furthermore, the cognitive distance between firms and URIs may weaken the value of 
academic collaborations. For instance, firms often cannot objectively rate universities as a 
source of information because of the differences in evaluations concerning the optimal quality 
of an invention (Howells et al., 2012). This cognitive distance can be particularly large when 
managers are trained to think “internally” (Grönlund et al., 2010) and have not developed an 
open culture. These costs may hamper the way in which knowledge from URIs can be 
combined with the firm’s own knowledge and therefore reduce the usefulness of academic 
collaborations. 
As academic collaborations come with a set of both benefits and costs, it is imperative to 
use a contingency approach to capture heterogeneity across regions and understand when and 
under what conditions academic collaborations are more beneficial for the firm. In the next 
section, we explain how the uneven institutional change across Chinese regions influences IPR 
enforcement, international openness and the research quality of URIs, and we address how 
these factors in turn affect the value of academic collaboration. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
3.1. Institutional variations across regions  
It has long been established that institutions set the rules that form a country’s incentive 
structures and economic specialization (North, 1990). Institutions can have a profound effect 
on a country’s innovation system by determining infrastructure, the quality of human capital 
and the resources available for innovation (Bosker and Garretsen, 2009; Roper et al., 2004). 
Whereas firms and URIs in Western economies operate in institutional environments that are 
stable and largely homogeneous within the country, subnational institutional variations in 
emerging countries such as China influence how markets function in different regions (Chang 
and Wu, 2013; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). The simultaneous operation of market and state-
controlled governance mechanisms creates a multi-layered institutional system that is moving 
in different directions across regions (Peck and Zhang, 2013).  
China’s open-door policy unraveled in three administrative decentralization phases, with 
each successive stage further empowering the regional government. The three phases (namely, 
delegation of responsibility for economic performance, tax contributions to the central 
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government and delegation of control for state-owned enterprises and organizations) led to a 
significant institutional and economic fragmentation of the country (Boisot and Meyer, 2008). 
It also created an institutional and administrative structure characterized by local 
protectionism, with each regional government controlling and protecting its own enterprises 
and organizations. 
Because institutions, which are part of the dynamics of innovation (Crescenzi et al., 
2013), vary significantly across Chinese regions, they can influence the effectiveness of a 
firm’s academic collaborations. Governments in different regions have distinct motives, 
objectives and preferences (Wang et al., 2012) and thus generate different institutional 
pressures that can affect the value of academic collaborations. We argue that these institutions, 
which are idiosyncratic to each region, may influence the effects of academic collaboration on 
EMEs’ innovativeness by affecting the strength of IPR enforcement, the degree of international 
openness (in terms of inward foreign direct investment, FDI), and the research quality of URIs 
in each region. The next sections discuss how administrative decentralization and the uneven 
development of institutions may lead to cross-regional variations in these three aspects and 
how these variations in turn affect the value of academic collaborations for EMEs. 
 
3.2. Cross-regional variations in IPR enforcement 
Appropriability regimes refer to factors that influence the ability of an organization to 
protect and capture the economic value of its innovations. A key dimension of an 
appropriability regime is the effectiveness of legal mechanisms to protect IPRs (Teece, 1986). 
IPR laws are typically underdeveloped or under-enforced in emerging economies, providing 
organizations with little protection from imitators and opportunistic behavior (Bradley et al., 
2012; Keupp et al., 2012). More importantly, whereas IPR laws in Western economies are 
equally suitable for all organizations within a given country, IPR enforcement differs 
significantly across regions in China due to uneven regional development in institutions and 
markets. Administrative decentralization has led regional authorities and provincial 
governments to have substantial judicial independence and frequently influence courts’ 
judgments (Peck and Zhang, 2013). Such institutional differences also lead to significant cross-
regional variations in the frequency of infringements, the effectiveness of courts, the 
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enforcement of contracts and the rules for innovation subsidies (Li and Qian, 2013; Li, 2012). 
This view is supported by evidence that indicates that IPR enforcement varies significantly 
across Chinese regions (Ang et al.,, 2014). In the next section, we discuss how such sub-
national differences in the strength of IPR enforcement influence the effects of academic 
collaborations on EMEs’ innovation performance. 
 
3.2.1 Effects of IPR enforcement on academic collaborations  
It is theoretically accepted that the effective protection of IPRs depends on both the 
existence of IP laws and their enforcement (Ang et al., 2014). However, in practice, although 
many emerging countries have IPR laws, their enforcement is problematic. We hypothesize 
that a region’s strength of IPR enforcement moderates the effects of academic collaborations 
on an EME’s innovation performance. Weak IPR enforcement increases transaction costs and 
the difficulty of writing and executing contracts. The regional fragmentation of China makes 
transactions among geographically scattered firms and URIs even more costly and impedes the 
potential to identify new opportunities for collaborations (Boisot and Meyer, 2008). 
Conversely, a strong IPR regime that enforces the law provides a protective framework for 
contractual agreements and R&D collaborations by increasing stability, improving partner 
commitment, and discouraging opportunistic behavior (Carson and John, 2013; Jean et al., 
2014). Therefore, a higher level of IPR enforcement increases the willingness of URIs and 
firms to share resources and knowledge in R&D collaborations, which may in turn lead to 
better innovation outcomes for the firm. 
Moreover, because URIs are moving away from the “open science” model that views 
knowledge as a public good and are increasingly focusing on the exploitation of internal 
knowledge and collaborative research partnerships with industry, they are placing a greater 
emphasis on protecting and capturing value from their IP (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012; 2013). Strong 
IPR enforcement allows URIs to commercially exploit ideas and IP generated from internal 
and collaborative research projects. For example, in 1999, the Chinese Ministry of Education 
issued legislations that allowed universities to protect and commercialize their IP. Since then, 
universities in regions that incorporated such legislations into their policies became more 
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enthused about collaborating with businesses (Hong, 2008), which may in turn lead to better 
innovation outcomes for the firm.  
Furthermore, R&D partners contribute different resources and knowledge. Therefore, it is 
critical to know each partner’s IP and rents from the potential innovation ex ante (Carson and 
John, 2013). A stronger IPR regime specifies each party’s rights, obligations and 
responsibilities, thus creating formal collaboration procedures (Jean et al., 2014). Nevertheless, 
as the collaboration evolves and the partners increase their investments and commitment, they 
become vulnerable and economically exposed in the case of opportunistic behavior. URIs are 
better protected from potentially opportunistic firms in regions with strong IPR mechanisms, 
which allows firms to devote new resources to collaboration because they feel that their IPRs 
are protected (Li, 2012). Similarly, firms are more willing to share knowledge with URIs when 
they know that they can prevent academic staff from opportunistically disseminating such 
information or using it in scientific publications. This increased willingness in turn enhances 
the efficiency of academic collaborations and can lead to improved innovation outcomes 
(Carson and John, 2013; Jean et al., 2014). 
Conversely, firms and academic institutions in regions with weak IPR enforcement might 
be reluctant to engage and invest in URI-firm collaborations, fearing that the opportunistic 
behavior of their partners will increase transaction costs and lower economic returns. Greater 
uncertainty in such regions may also result in the renegotiations of contracts in which a firm 
can bargain opportunistically and therefore make the university less willing to fully commit to 
R&D collaborations (Carson and John, 2013). Indeed, weak legislation and enforcement 
constitute a major obstacle that restricts the positive effects of URI-firm R&D collaboration in 
China (Chang and Shih, 2004). Hence, we expect IPR enforcement in a region to positively 
moderate the effects of academic collaborations on EMEs’ innovation performance: 
Hypothesis 1. The stronger the IPR enforcement is in a given subnational region of an 
emerging country, the stronger the effects of academic collaborations on an EME’s innovation 
performance will be. 
 
3.3. Cross-regional variations in international openness  
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China’s recent growth and transformation has relied on its international openness and 
ability to attract inward FDI. Furthermore, the central government in China has long pursued 
state rules and policies that support the development of certain regions at the expense of others. 
Open-door policies prioritized the development of China’s eastern coastal regions by 
encouraging trade and FDI (Liu, 2013). For example, policies in the 1980s established special 
economic zones in four coastal cities and gradually expanded to another fourteen coastal cities, 
widening the coast-inland divide in terms of international openness. Furthermore, in 1988, the 
Beijing Experimental Zone for New Technology and Industrial Development was set up, and 
18 preferential policies on taxes, loans, and personnel mobility and recruitment were granted to 
support its development (Liu et al., 2011). The State Council gradually approved 52 similar 
economic zones across the country. Nevertheless, the largest zones were located in coastal 
cities, with many of them benefiting from multiple establishments in their locality.  
In an attempt to alleviate this increasing inter-regional divide, the Chinese government 
launched the Western Development Strategy in 1999. This strategy offered policy incentives to 
encourage openness through international trade and inward and outward FDI in six Western 
provinces. Despite this initiative, however, the level of international openness, particularly in 
terms of international trade and FDI, is still considerably higher in the eastern/coastal regions 
compared to inland regions. These variations have made international openness in China 
spatially and structurally uneven. For example, Shanghai reported the highest trade-to-GDP 
and FDI-to-GDP ratios in 2010, whereas Qinghai’s ratios were the lowest in the country 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). These cross-regional variations in international 
openness have also led to the faster growth and development of technology and science parks 
located in the eastern coastal regions and controlled by ‘elite’ universities (Hu, 2007). 
 
3.3.1 Effects of international openness on academic collaborations 
We expect a region’s degree of international openness to moderate the effects of academic 
collaborations on EMEs’ innovation performance. International openness and inward FDI can 
strengthen a region’s economy and accelerate technological catch-up (Todtling and Trippl, 
2005). It can also stimulate innovation through spillovers, demonstration effects and 
competition (García et al., 2013; Kafouros and Buckley, 2008). As multinational enterprises 
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(MNEs) enter the host market, they create relationships with academic institutions to increase 
the understanding of the market and reduce transaction costs (Chan et al., 2010).  
China’s FDI policy has traditionally been based on the ‘trading market for technology’ 
incentive, which requires foreign companies to transfer technology to China and collaborate 
with universities (Mu and Lee, 2005). For example, Tsinghua University in Beijing 
collaborates with various companies, such as IBM, Siemens and Motorola, forming knowledge 
networks, collecting and circulating R&D information, and establishing training centers (Liu 
and Jiang, 2001). In this manner, academic institutions gain access to new knowledge and 
become repositories of the technology and management practices that MNEs bring with them. 
Thus, the institutions can transfer knowledge and new technology to local firms through 
academic collaborations, enhancing EMEs’ innovation capabilities. 
Furthermore, although foreign investment has focused on the relocation of production in 
the past, many MNEs have recently offshored R&D activities to emerging economies. For 
example, over 20% of FDI in the pharmaceutical industry is R&D-related, and large 
pharmaceutical companies, such as Merck and GlaxoSmithKline, have entered drug-discovery 
alliances with URIs in emerging countries (Haakonsson et al., 2013). Hence, as innovations 
that are aimed at the world market are generated in collaboration with universities, EMEs can 
work with leading scientists in regions with higher international openness and develop new 
capabilities and innovations. 
Prior studies also suggest that international openness establishes global pipelines that link 
emerging countries to developed economies around the world (Bathelt and Li, 2014). In 
regions with higher international openness, local academic institutions will act as bridges to the 
new foreign knowledge and technology that flows through such global pipelines. Therefore, 
domestic EMEs can work with and benefit from more knowledgeable and globally connected 
URIs. Because FDI reinforces a well-developed regional innovation system (Crescenzi et al., 
2013), the unequal geographic distribution of FDI in China may result in significant 
differences in the performance outcomes of the firm’s academic collaborations. Thus, we 
expect a region’s level of international openness to positively moderate the effects of academic 
collaborations on an EME’s innovation performance. Hence: 
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Hypothesis 2. The higher the level of international openness is in a given subnational region 
of an emerging country, the stronger the effects of academic collaborations on an EME’s 
innovation performance will be. 
 
3.4. Cross-regional variations in the research quality of URIs 
Chinese scientists and academics have in recent years significantly increased their 
scientific publication rate, propelling China to have the second-highest scientific publication 
rate in the world (Zhang et al., 2013). Nevertheless, administrative decentralization and 
institutional variations led to an unequal distribution of strong URIs across regions and to 
investments selectively targeted at the elite URIs, which are predominantly located in eastern 
and coastal regions (Zhang et al., 2013). The Chinese government implemented a range of 
policies to resolve this imbalance and to assist URIs in less developed regions to reach the 
national average by 2020. For instance, the Ministry of Education issued the Revitalization 
Initiative of Higher Education for the Central and Western Regions, aimed at the development 
of ‘priority’ scientific and social disciplines and the improvement of the research and teaching 
quality of academic staff in universities located in inland China.  
In addition, the Chinese government designed policies to assist URIs in such regions, to 
retain scientific talent, and to attract new and apply for research grants from the central 
government. However, the quality gap between coastal and inland URIs remains wide. For 
example, sub-national variations in the quality of academic talent and institutions in China are 
reflected in the number of ‘elite’ universities in each region (Eun et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 
2013). The average number of academic papers published in international journals per 
academic in Beijing, Shanghai and Jiangsu are 0.628, 0.593 and 0.251, respectively. These 
figures are considerably higher than those for Tibet (0.014), Guizhou (0.039) and Xinjiang 
(0.014) (China Yearbook of Science & Technology, 2013). Similarly, Beijing, Jiangsu, and 
Shanghai have 26, 11 and 9 elite universities, respectively, whereas Guangxi and Guizhou each 
have only one university in the elite group. Similarly, the ratio of university faculties with a 
professor title is 0.20 in Beijing but only 0.04 in Tibet (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2011).  
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Furthermore, geographic constraints in knowledge flows are particularly salient due to 
regional governments’ preference for collaborations between local universities and local firms 
(Hong and Su, 2013). Whereas knowledge and technologies tended to diffuse from elite 
academics and institutions to firms or other URIs in distant regions under the former planned 
system, recent reforms and the development of decentralization have affected this support and 
left regions with second- and third-tier universities further behind (Hong, 2008). This situation 
leads to a vicious cycle of development and ultimately limits the role of URI-firm 
collaboration and technological development in these regions. 
 
3.4.1 Effects of the research quality of URIs on academic collaborations  
Because of such subnational variations, we expect the effects of academic collaborations 
on EMEs’ innovation performance to depend on the quality of academic talent in URIs in the 
region in which the firm operates. High-quality, research-active URIs not only provide firms 
with access to their own knowledge but also act as boundary spanners, connect firms to a 
broader community of scientists, and translate tacit knowledge to codified knowledge, thus 
leading to potential innovations (Hess and Rothaemel, 2011). These localized knowledge flows 
from top-tier academic institutions to businesses may improve firm performance and 
innovation (George et al., 2002; Kafouros et al., 2012) and enable firms and URIs to develop 
novel combinations and products together (Zucker and Darby, 1997). 
Furthermore, the research quality of URIs is reflected in their knowledge transfer 
strategies, activities, and engagement with businesses. Research-intensive URIs and academics 
undertake a considerably greater amount of technology transfer activities aimed at helping 
businesses compared with less research-intensive universities (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). Leading 
research universities employ highly talented scientists, who devote their time to conducting 
research in cutting-edge technologies and in turn view URI-firm collaborations as a fertile 
ground for developing and testing theories, commercializing innovations, training students and 
generating funds for further research (George et al., 2002). Hence, firms that engage in 
academic collaborations benefit from access to high-quality URIs in the region and may avoid 
having to travel to engage with top-tier institutions (Doran et al., 2012; Laursen et al., 2011). 
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By contrast, less research-intensive universities concentrate on teaching and human capital 
development through professional courses for the local community (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). 
They also receive modest research funding and are thus less likely to possess and offer the 
research resources and capabilities needed for firm innovation (Laursen et al., 2011). Recent 
research supports the view that such collaborations in China are region specific, indicating that 
geographic distance has a negative effect on academic collaborations (Hong and Su, 2013). As 
a result, firms in regions with high-quality academics and ‘elite’ URIs benefit more from their 
geographic proximity, whereas firms in less-favored regions are left behind. These differential 
effects are strengthened when regional governments encourage firms in their jurisdiction to 
collaborate with local URIs to ensure that R&D investments and subsidies will stay within 
their territory (Hong and Su, 2013). This imposed local matching of URIs and firms makes the 
role of region-specific university quality even more important in influencing firms’ innovation 
performance. Accordingly, we introduce our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. The higher the research quality of URIs is in a given subnational region of an 
emerging country, the stronger the effects of academic collaborations on an EME’s innovation 
performance will be. 
The theoretical framework is summarized in Figure 1.  
 (Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
4. Methods and data 
4.1. Empirical setting and data  
China is a leading country in the world in terms of patent output and R&D expenditures. 
This remarkable growth in innovative output was accompanied by profound changes in the 
political, educational and economic institutions of the country over the last three decades. 
China is currently considered a mid-range emerging economy (Xu and Meyer, 2013). The 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy is implemented unevenly across 
regions, creating sub-national disparities in institutional setups and development (Meyer and 
Nguyen, 2005). Moreover, China’s National Innovation System (NSI) is founded on its 
academic institutions, and the government’s goal is for the country to be among the elite global 
scientific powers (Zhang, et al., 2013). Thus, China provides an appropriate setting for testing 
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our framework and examining how region-specific idiosyncrasies influence the relationship 
between academic collaborations and firms’ innovation performance.  
We draw our data from a unique firm-level dataset entitled the ‘Innovation-Oriented Firms 
Database’ (IOFD), which is compiled annually by the Ministry of Science and Technology of 
China (MSTC). This database is based on a survey of the 400 most innovative Chinese firms, 
which are selected for the survey based on five aspects of their performance: R&D intensity, 
the number of granted patents per thousand R&D personnel, the ratio of new product sales to 
total revenue, their labor productivity, and innovations related to organization and 
management. These criteria are line with the definition of active and innovative firms in the 
Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005). The surveyed firms undergo a screening by the MSTC to check 
that they meet the required criteria, namely, to have a minimum threshold for R&D intensity, 
have developed patents and have introduced product, process or service innovations in last 
three calendar years. Successful entrants receive a government subsidy subject to completing 
the survey each year.  
The use of this unique dataset has three important advantages. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is one of the most detailed innovation surveys in China. Second, there is a high 
reliability among the reported data, as this is not an independent, self-administered survey but 
is instead administered and managed by the Chinese government. Third, despite the relatively 
small size of the sample, the surveyed firms are well represented in terms of ownership, 
industrial and geographic coverage. They consist of both state and non-state owned firms, 
spanning 22 three-digit industries in medicine, general machinery, electrical appliances and 
communications and computers and all 31 provinces in China (excluding Hong Kong, Macau 
and Taiwan). After excluding some outliers, the final sample consists of 375 firms with 
complete data for the period between 2008 and 2011.  
Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of the sampled firms. Section A shows that 
the Eastern region accounts for approximately half of the firms, whereas the Central and 
Western regions each account for slightly less than one quarter of the firms. This pattern is in 
line with the more rapid economic development and growth of eastern coastal regions 
compared to inland regions. Furthermore, the sampled firms’ ownership structure exhibits 
comparative symmetry, which shows an equal representation of firms in terms of the share of 
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state assets (those between 50% and 100% and those with lower than 50%). Furthermore, 
government research institutes are the largest receivers of government funding (in 2006, R&D 
expenditure for research institutes and universities comprised 49.4% and 15.2% of the total 
expenditures, respectively) (OECD, 2009). In addition, most non-state controlled businesses 
fund R&D projects with universities (36.6%) instead of institutes (4.5%) (OECD, 2009). 
Hence, SOEs in the Western and Central regions tend to collaborate more with government-
controlled research institutes. As noted earlier, this trend is also consistent with regional 
protectionism and local authorities’ preference to match local firms to local URIs. Many firms 
in the Western and Central regions may be SOEs that have substantial in-house R&D 
capabilities and collaborate with public research institutes rather than universities. In contrast, 
in the Eastern region, non-state firms dominate and tend to rely more on universities rather 
than public research institutes. In terms of industry distribution, Section B shows five two-digit 
industries with the highest number of firms - these together accounted for over 58% of the 
sampled firms. Therefore, we can control for the industrial effects by concentrating on these 
five industries.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
To test the representativeness of our sampled firms, we collected data from the Annual 
Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics (ARIES), obtained from the State Statistical Bureau of 
China. The ARIES is one of the most comprehensive firm-level dataset ever compiled by the 
Chinese statistical office, accounting for approximately 90 percent of total output in most 
industries2. It includes manufacturing firms with an annual turnover of over five million 
Renminbi. Because our sample focuses on innovation-oriented firms only, we derived a further 
sub-sample from the ARIES (15,943 firms in 2007) containing R&D-intensive firms, and 
selected firms with above-average R&D intensity (3,817 firms). We used this latter sub-sample 
to test the representativeness of our study’s sample.  
More specifically, we conducted t-tests to examine the representativeness of our sample in 
terms of R&D intensity (in 2008) and innovation performance (in 2009 due to the use of a time 
lag), which are commonly accepted as the two of the most important indicators of innovative 
                                                          
2 Different versions of this dataset have been used in previous studies (e.g., Wang et al., 2012; Yi et al., 2009). 
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firms (Table 2 provides a definition of these variables). The results show that we can reject the 
null hypothesis; there is no difference between our sample and the population (t ratio=0.681 for 
R&D intensity and t ratio=1.578 for innovation performance). Therefore, although our sample 
cannot be regarded as large, it can fairly represent the population of innovation-oriented or 
R&D-intensive firms in China.  
 
4.2. Measures 
4.2.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, innovation performance, is measured by the share of new product 
sales, i.e., products new to the firm, new to the domestic market and new to foreign markets, 
over total sales. Similar measures have been widely used in previous studies (e.g., Berchicci, 
2013; Laursen and Salter, 2006; OECD, 2005). Although the number of patents was available 
to us and has been used in other studies, it fails to capture the broad range of innovations 
developed by a company. In addition, not all innovations require patenting. Furthermore, as the 
propensity of patent applications varies considerably across different industries (Griliches, 
1990) and can lead to estimation biases, we decided not to use this measure.  
 
4.2.2. Independent variables 
Our key independent variable, academic collaboration, refers to a firm’s degree of 
collaboration with academic institutions. It is measured as the ratio of the firm’s R&D 
spending on collaborations with URIs to total R&D expenditures. These collaborations consist 
of cooperated R&D, contracted R&D and other technological consultancy services. Because it 
is a continuous variable, this operationalization better captures the extent of academic 
collaboration than merely reporting whether firms collaborate with URIs. Ideally, we would 
prefer to exclude R&D expenditure used for collaboration with URIs from other regions. 
However, our dataset does not allow us to create separate measures for intra- and inter-regional 
collaborations. Nevertheless, prior evidence shows that the vast majority of firm-URI 
collaborations are in the same region (Hong, 2008) and that when a firm and URI are 
controlled or owned by the same ministry or the same local government, their probability of 
collaboration increases by approximately 25% and 64% (Hong and Su, 2013). Because much 
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of the knowledge transferred between URIs and firms is tacit and requires interaction (Polanyi, 
1967), there is a consensus in the literature (see Hong, 2008 for a review of the evidence) that 
firms are more likely to collaborate with URIs that are geographically close. 
Indeed, evidence from different countries indicates that geographic distance acts as an 
important constraint on firm-university collaboration (Anselin et al., 1997; Audrestch and 
Feldman, 1996; Branstetter, 2000; Jaffe, 1989), which becomes even more difficult in large 
countries such as China. Indeed, Hong (2008) finds a strong localizing trend in knowledge 
flows from universities to firms in China. Abramovsky and Simpson (2011) suggest that 
chemical firms in the UK tend to collaborate with universities that are within a 10 km radius. 
Similarly, using Chinese patents, Hong and Su (2013) demonstrated that geographic distance 
impedes firm-university collaborations. Therefore, although our measure may include some 
inter-regional collaboration in some cases and is not as accurate as distinct measures of intra- 
and inter-regional collaborations, this aspect is not likely to introduce a serious bias in the 
results. 
Furthermore, because academic collaboration comes with a set of benefits and costs, its 
effect on firms’ innovation performance might not be linear and monotonic. For several 
reasons, the performance effects of academic collaboration may begin to decline and 
eventually become negative when the degree of such collaboration goes beyond a certain 
threshold. Although the number of potential combinations increases with increasing URI-firm 
collaboration, an excessive degree of university collaboration may significantly increase an 
EME’s governance, coordination and managerial costs (Mindruta, 2013). Because innovation 
requires managerial time and accurate planning, managers must focus their efforts and energy 
on a limited number of tasks (Ocasio, 1997). A particularly high degree of URI-firm 
engagement may also increase the risk of knowledge leakage (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). 
Hence, when the degree of academic collaboration is particularly high, the costs of university 
collaborations may outweigh their benefits, thus leading to an inverse U-shaped relationship.  
Three variables may moderate the effects of academic collaborations. Region-specific IPR 
enforcement is measured as the ratio of settled IP infringements to the total number of IP 
infringements in a region. The data are obtained from the website of the State Intellectual 
Property Office of China (SIPO). According to the SIPO, IPR violation is defined as the 
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production, use and sale of products using patents of other people and organizations without 
the legal permission of the IP holder. These include violations of IP rights, other disputes 
related to IPR and counterfeit products. Because the cases that are referred to government 
agencies and courts might take more than one year to settle, we used an accumulated measure.  
In previous studies, IPR enforcement has typically been measured by either survey-based 
perception of IPR enforcement (see Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997) or the existence of 
mechanisms for enforcement (e.g., Park and Ginarte, 1997; Zhao, 2006). The former is 
subjective and depends on who is surveyed, whereas the latter considers the existence of 
enforcement laws without considering the effectiveness of these laws (i.e., the outcomes). By 
contrast, our operationalization focuses on the outcomes of IPR enforcement. Although better 
enforcement can encourage innovative activities by mitigating the risks of expropriation and 
information asymmetry, better enforcement could also exert a negative impact on innovation. 
Stronger IPR enforcement can impede innovation activities by constraining inter-
organizational knowledge flows because of limited disclosures of the details of invention in the 
patent application and the resulting accumulation of sleeping patents (Bessen and Maskin, 
2000; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). Strong IPR protection can also become an obstacle for 
future innovations that cumulatively build on previous fundamental knowledge and 
technologies because they can inhibit the exploration and exploitation of alternative 
applications of the patented invention (Dosi, et al. 2006). For example, Mergers and Nelson 
(1994) demonstrate how a strong IPR regime significantly slowed the pace of aircraft 
development in the USA. 
Because our hypotheses rely on the outcomes of IPR enforcement, it is appropriate to 
measure this parameter instead of the existence of IPR laws (which tend to be the same across 
regions). This operationalization is suitable because although China signed major international 
IP treaties3, there are discrepancies between the written laws and their enforcement at the local 
and subnational levels (Ang et al., 2014). Furthermore, unlike in developed countries, IP 
infringements in China have a ‘dual enforcement’ system that allows holders of IP rights to use 
                                                          
3 According to prior research (e.g., Park and Ginarte, 1997), the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT), and International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)) are the three major 
international agreements. China has membership in all three agreements. 
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either civil or administrative mechanisms to resolve IP disputes. Therefore, the degree of 
region-specific IPR enforcement captures how effectively IP infringements are addressed in 
each region (despite the fact that IPR laws are set by central governments and are similar for 
all regions; Ang et al., 2014). Thus, a higher ratio of settled IP infringements to the total 
number of reported IP infringements in a region leads to a stronger IPR regime in the region. 
Region-specific international openness is measured by the ratio of inward FDI to GDP in 
a given region. This value captures both foreign Western capital and investments from Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan. This operationalization is consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Cuadros et al., 2004; Fan et al., 2010). The region-specific research quality of URIs is 
operationalized by the average number of academic papers published in international journals 
per academic in a given region. This measure is consistent with prior studies that considered 
URIs in emerging countries (e.g., Zhang et al., 2013). Over 96% of these publications are in 
the areas of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2013). Because the performance of the scientific achievements of 
university professors is largely reflected in their international research publications, a higher 
average number of publications in a given region suggests that more ‘star’ academics and 
higher-quality URIs are present in that region. 
4.2.3. Control variables 
We control for a number of firm-specific idiosyncrasies. We measure firm size using the 
logarithm of total number of employees. Firm age is calculated using the number of years 
since a firm’s establishment. We control for the R&D resources and capabilities of the firm 
using three R&D-related variables. First, R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to the total number of employees. Second, overseas R&D is operationalized using 
a dummy that equals 1 if the company has an R&D center overseas and 0 otherwise. Third, the 
firm’s patent stock can influence the development of new products in the following years. We 
include this variable, which is measured as the logarithm of the amount of patent stock. As 
diversification can impact innovation both positively and negatively (Jarrar and Smith, 2011), 
we also control for the firm’s diversification using a dummy that equals 1 if the company is 
diversified covering at least 2 two-digit industries and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, the state 
ownership of the company influences innovation performance. We control for this variable 
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using a dummy that equals 1 if the share of state-owned assets is greater than 50 percent in a 
given firm and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for time and industry effects. We created an 
industry dummy that is equal to 1 if the company is affiliated with one of the five 2-digit 
industries and 0 otherwise, as shown in Table 1. Time controls are operationalized by 
assigning a dummy that is equal to 1 if associated with the corresponding year and 0 otherwise. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the variables and their definitions. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
4.3. Econometric model and estimation method 
Because the value of the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 100, it does not satisfy the 
assumption of an even distribution on number lines without interception. Therefore, a Tobit 
model is applied (Wooldridge, 2002), which is the established practice in innovation studies 
that use a similar dependent variable (e.g., Berchicci, 2013; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Tsai, 
2009). In addition, the difficulty in fulfilling the requirement for the normality of residuals 
necessitates the use of a logarithmic transformation for the dependent variable (for details, 
please see Table 2). We also use lags for all independent variables for one year to account for 
the fact that innovation takes time to materialize. The adoption of this lag structure also 
alleviates potential simultaneity between URI-firm collaborations and innovation performance. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is a typical problem in panel data analysis. This phenomenon 
occurs because ‘each firm contributes multiple observations that are not independent from each 
other’ (Jensen and Zajac, 2004). This situation increases the possibility that current innovation 
performance appears to influence firm decisions. We have included a large number of control 
variables (patent stock in particular) that should alleviate some of these concerns (Blundell et 
al., 1995). However, there might be other firm-level idiosyncrasies that can still influence the 
results. A common approach to address this problem is to use either fixed or random effects 
(Sayrs, 1989), both of which can accommodate unobserved heterogeneity.  
We chose random-effects models for two reasons. First, fixed-effects models are less 
efficient than random-effects models because of the lost degree of freedom (Wooldridge, 
2002). Fixed-effects models may lead to biased estimates by producing inflated standard errors 
for variables that exhibit little variation within units. More importantly, fixed-effects models 
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tend to produce biased results when the time period is short (Chintagunta et al., 1991; 
Heckman, 1981). As our data cover only 4 years, fixed-effects models are not appropriate. 
Second, as Tobit is a non-linear function and the likelihood estimator for fixed effects is biased 
and inconsistent, fixed-effect estimates cannot be realized in the panel Tobit model. By 
contrast, random effects utilize between-unit variations and allow for different intercepts. 
Nevertheless, the pooled estimate allows us to use the fixed-effects models (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2010) and thus make a comparison with random-effects models. All F tests (in Tables 
4 and 4A) reject the fixed-effect option and support the random-effect estimates.  
 
5. Results 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables. Most of the correlations are 
fairly low (except those between firm size and patent stock), and the variance inflation factors 
range from 1 to 6.75, with a mean of 1.83. These factors are all well below the acceptable level 
of 10 (Ryan, 1997). Following the typical practice (Aiken and West, 1991), we mean-centered 
the interaction terms to alleviate potential multicollinearity problems and to increase the 
interpretability of the findings (Aiken and West, 1991). 
 (Insert Table 3 here)  
Table 4 reports the regression results. Model 1 includes only the control variables and 
serves as the baseline model. Model 2 includes both the linear and squared terms of academic 
collaborations. The linear term is positive, but the squared term is negative. The results predict 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between URI-firm collaborations and firms’ innovation 
performance. The point at which the benefits of academic collaboration begin to decline can be 
estimated by taking the partial derivative of Model 2 with respect to the academic 
collaboration variable. This partial derivative represents the slope of the innovation 
performance curve with respect to academic collaboration. It implies that innovation 
performance reaches a maximum point (the critical level of academic collaboration) and 
subsequently declines as the negative effects dominate the positive effects with rising levels of 
academic collaboration. The turning point was found to be 0.209, or 20.9%. Therefore, in 
accordance with our previous discussion, there is an optimal level of engagement a firm can 
have with academic institutions before its innovation performance begins to deteriorate.  
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Surprisingly, IPR enforcement has a negative direct effect on innovation performance 
(Models 3 and 6). One possible explanation for this result is that a share of sales of ‘new 
products’ in Chinese firms relies on the imitation of existing products and the recombination of 
existing components that can be found from outside (a practice known as architectural 
innovation). Indeed, many EMEs possess a good functional understanding of external 
technologies (Wu et al., 2010), which can be used to develop innovations using inputs 
available from the market. In such cases, stronger IPR enforcement may be beneficial for 
companies that generate new technologies themselves but may have adverse effects for 
companies that rely on external technologies and knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, previous 
research also suggests that enforcing stronger IPR mechanisms in developing economies that 
rely on advanced technologies and imitation of products from developed countries will reduce 
the rate of EMEs’ innovation (Lai, 1998). 
Models 3-5 present the results for the hypotheses.4 Model 3 illustrates that the coefficient 
of the interaction term between academic collaboration and IPR enforcement is statistically 
significant, providing support for H1. This observation means that stronger IPR enforcement in 
a region increases the positive effects of academic collaborations on a firm’s innovation 
performance. Furthermore, the interaction term between academic collaboration and 
international openness in Model 4 is positive and statistically significant. Hence, H2 is also 
supported. H3 suggests that the innovation performance effects of academic collaboration will 
be stronger in regions with higher-quality URIs. The relevant interaction term in Model 5 is 
statistically significant and positive, corroborating H3. To better explain the moderating effects 
of region-specific institutions, these relationships are presented in Figure 2.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
5.1. Robustness checks 
                                                          
2 Following similar studies (e.g., Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Berchicci, 2013), we do not include the interactions 
between the squared term and moderators.  
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We performed various analyses to ensure that our findings are robust. One concern arises 
from the potential correlation between academic collaboration and the error term due to 
possible simultaneity between academic collaboration and innovation performance. As 
improvements in innovation performance can lead to increases in academic collaboration, they 
may result in an upward bias of the estimated effects of academic collaboration. Thus, 
although our use of random-effects models can alleviate the concern of unobserved 
heterogeneity, it is important to check whether academic collaboration is endogenous. We use 
the Dubin-Wu-Hausman method to test for endogeneity. We first identified valid instrumental 
variables (IVs). A valid instrument should be correlated with the key explanatory variables and 
also be orthogonal to the error term.  
Following Berchicci (2013), we choose industry-level academic collaboration and 
strategic alliance as instruments. Industry-level academic collaboration is defined as the 
average ratio of the firm’s R&D spending on collaborations with URIs to the total R&D 
expenditures in an industry. Strategic alliance is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is involved 
in a strategic alliance and 0 otherwise. The industry-level academic collaboration is selected 
because it may account for an important part of a firm’s academic collaboration at the firm 
level. Similarly, involvement in strategic alliances is also closely related to the level of a firm’s 
academic collaboration. The Hansen tests of over-identification in Table 4 confirm that these 
instruments are valid and not correlated to the error term. Using these two instruments, the 
Dubin-Wu-Hausman tests in Table 4 show that the variable of academic collaboration 
(including the squared term and its interactions) is exogenous except in Model 5.5 Therefore, 
our results are not biased by potential endogeneity pertaining to the academic collaboration 
variable.  
Second, to overcome potential heterogeneity and autocorrelation problems that are typical 
of panel data, we examined the validity of our results using robust standard errors. Due to the 
unfeasibility of using the traditional White method in the Tobit model, we employed the 
bootstrap method (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). The results are presented in Table 4A. The 
                                                          
5 This finding may explain why the coefficient of the interaction term between academic collaboration and the 
research quality of universities is significant in Model 5 but not in Model 6 (the full model).  
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new results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4 except for the interaction term 
between academic collaboration and the research quality of URIs, which is now insignificant.  
Third, because innovation can significantly contribute to productivity (Hall et al., 2009), 
we use the ratio of new product sales to the number of employees as the dependent variable to 
re-estimate the models. The results are qualitatively identical to those reported in Table 4. 
Finally, we have included all variables including interactions in one regression (Model 6 in 
Tables 4 and 4A). The first two interaction terms remain qualitatively unchanged (supporting 
H1 and H2), but the interaction term of academic collaboration and the research quality of 
URIs is now insignificant, thus lending no support for H3. 
 (Insert Table 4A here) 
  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1. Theoretical Implications 
Our study challenges the assumption of institutional homogeneity within a given country. 
We argue that sub-national institutional variations within China determine IPR enforcement, 
international openness, the quality of URIs and thus the role of academic collaborations in 
enhancing the innovativeness of Chinese EMEs. Our findings have several implications for 
research pertaining to the effects of academic collaborations on a firm’s innovation 
performance and the sources of competitive advantages that enable EMEs to innovate. 
First, although research recognizes the role of institutions in shaping the innovation 
performance of firms from developed economies, little is known about the ways in which 
institutions influence firms’ innovation in emerging countries and how such effects differ from 
those in developed countries (Xu and Meyer, 2013). Although Western country firms are not 
completely self-sufficient, they often invest in internal R&D capabilities for several decades 
and build their innovation models around a set of mature and homogeneous institutions and 
established innovation systems. By contrast, EMEs are at an early stage of innovation and can 
only rarely be self-sufficient. Hence, they not only innovate in a different environment but also 
exhibit greater dependence on their environment. In the Chinese context, the political and 
institutional transformation gives regional governments a high degree of authority and 
autonomy (Chan et al., 2010). Our findings reveal that such region-specific institutional 
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idiosyncrasies affect the outcomes of academic collaborations and may explain why EMEs’ 
innovation strategy, which relies heavily on URIs, improves their position in the global race 
for technological leadership. Because our analysis extends beyond the boundaries of the firm 
to explain the origins of innovation in emerging countries, it deviates from established 
innovation theories for developed countries that emphasize the importance of a firm’s own 
innovative capabilities. 
Second, we demonstrate how cross-regional institutional variations influence IPR 
enforcement, international openness and the research quality of URIs and thus the 
effectiveness of academic collaborations in enhancing a firm’s innovation performance. 
Because our approach explains why academic collaborations are more beneficial in some 
regions than in others, it helps us establish a conceptual link between two important yet 
previously isolated bodies of literature, namely, those on academic collaborations and those on 
regional innovation systems. By showing that the value of academic collaborations depends on 
the specific combinations of firm-specific factors and location-specific institutions, we 
complement the research on regional innovation systems (e.g., Edquist, 1997; Kumaresan and 
Miyazaki, 1999) that has neglected the role of institutions (Doloreux and Parto, 2005). 
Furthermore, by showing that the effectiveness of academic collaboration depends on the 
strength of IPRs, the level of international openness and the research quality of URIs in a 
region, we extend previous research that has neglected subnational differences (e.g., Fabrizio, 
2006; George et al, 2002; Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2013; Zucker and Darby, 1997). We 
show that such variations can explain why two collaborative agreements that involve partners 
with similar characteristics may yield different innovation outcomes in different regions of the 
same emerging country.  
Finally, our findings reveal that collaboration with URIs enhances a firm’s innovation 
performance but only to a certain threshold. The finding of an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between university collaborations and innovation performance supports the view that the over-
utilization of external knowledge and technology may hinder a firm’s innovation performance 
(Berchicci, 2013; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). This negative marginal 
effect, which is found when firms over-engage with universities, might be particularly 
pronounced for emerging market innovators because of their limited absorptive capacity and 
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limited internal R&D capabilities (Motohashi and Yun, 2007; Zahra and George, 2002). 
Insufficient absorptive capacity makes it difficult for these firms to move away from a set of 
internal processes and to reconfigure the way in which value is created by managing the 
external-oriented innovation processes. It also makes it more difficult for them to cope with the 
challenges that over-search and over-openness create (Grönlund et al., 2010). This finding has 
implications for the current thinking about the balance between the development of internal 
innovative (and absorptive) capabilities and reliance on external sources of knowledge.  
 
6.2. Management and Policy Implications 
 One practical implication concerns the way in which different regions in emerging 
countries can benefit from collaborations with URIs. Our findings suggest that governments 
that aim to stimulate innovation in their territories should implement policies in ways that 
shape the development of region-specific and innovation-supporting institutions. Rather than 
merely relying on conventional science and technology policies that focus on the supply side 
of R&D and the individual firm (e.g., the direct provision of R&D subsidies and venture 
capital), governments should also formulate policies that create institutional conditions that 
enhance the effects of URI-firm collaborations.  
The government can influence three conditions to enhance the effectiveness of such 
collaborations. First, regional authorities should strengthen IPR enforcement in their 
jurisdictions and ‘allow’ for impartial justice in IP infringements. This behavior may have a 
negative effect on the innovation performance of some firms in the short run but may 
encourage firms to develop their own technological capabilities. Second, local governments 
should consider the implementation of international openness policies that facilitate links 
between their regions and the knowledge bases in developed economies around the world and 
which further encourage foreign firms to outsource R&D to local universities, thus enhancing 
the value of URI-firm collaborations. Third, because star scientists act as a bridge between 
universities and other sources of upstream knowledge (Hess and Rothaermel, 2011), regional 
governments should improve the research quality of universities by creating an environment 
that keeps leading academics and enable them to best utilize their talent.  
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Finally, our analysis suggests that over-engagement with academic institutions can be 
detrimental to a firm’s innovation performance. Hence, it may be advantageous for firms to 
have fewer but more valuable academic collaborations. Accordingly, managers will have the 
time to establish shared processes, address initial ambiguities and communication gaps, and 
create a better fit with academic institutions (Liebeskind et al., 1996; Prahbu, 1999: Rotaermel 
and Deeds, 2006).  
 
6.3. Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The first limitation of this study concerns the generalizability of the results. The firms in 
our sample are R&D-intensive firms and may not represent many other Chinese firms that 
invest little in R&D. Although the firms in our sample span a variety of sectors, they are all 
based in one emerging economy. Although China is leading the way in terms of innovation, the 
region-specific institutional idiosyncrasies that form the basis of our framework may differ in 
other emerging countries. Examining whether and which institutional factors in other emerging 
countries moderate the effects of academic collaboration on firms’ innovation performance is a 
worthwhile avenue for future research.  
Second, due to data constraints, we could not examine the informal contacts between 
firms and academic institutions. Academic collaborations, despite being common and highly 
valued, are often informal and thus rarely officially acknowledged (Zucker and Darby, 1997). 
Such informal links take the form of networking activities and personal relationships between 
firm members and academics. Although these links can enhance firms’ knowledge bases, firms 
often underestimate their real value because they are not product- or solution-oriented (Feller 
et al., 2002). Future research can overcome this shortcoming by devising specific survey 
measures to capture these informal links and their effects on innovation performance.  
In summary, we have argued that because innovation, URI-firm collaboration and 
institutional theories have been created with developed countries in mind, they rest on a set of 
assumptions that are not always adequate to explain EMEs’ innovation models. Because 
institutions are government-controlled and region-specific, they create a unique innovation 
milieu that moderates the effectiveness of academic collaborations in improving innovation 
performance. The firms in our sample compensate for their limited internal R&D capabilities 
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by pursing an innovation strategy that heavily relies on academic collaborations. Depending on 
the effects of region-specific institutional idiosyncrasies on and the degree of academic 
collaborations, emerging market firms can increase their innovation performance and thus their 
ability to become more competitive. 
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Table 1 
Firm distribution by provinces, ownership and industry in the sample (N=375) 
Section A: Distribution by provinces and ownership 
 
Provinces Number of firms  Ratio (%) 
Number of firms according to 
share of state assets 
 between 50% and 
100% 
<50% 
 
 
 
 
Eastern region 
Beijing 31 8.27 26 5 
Tianjin 11 2.93 8 3 
Zhejiang 28 7.47 4 24 
Shandong 22 5.87 8 14 
Guangdong 22 5.87 8 14 
Fujian 19 5.07 10 9 
Liaoning 16 4.27 6 10 
Jiangsu 15 4.00 4 11 
Shanghai 15 4.00 9 6 
Hebei 9 2.40 5 4 
Hainan 8 2.13 0 8 
Sub-total   196 52.30 88 (45%) 108 (55%) 
 
 
Central  
region 
Anhui 15 4.00 8 7 
Henan 13 3.47 5 8 
Heilongjiang 12 3.20 8 4 
Hunan 11 2.93 7 4 
Jilin 10 2.67 5 5 
Hubei 9 2.40 6 3 
Jiangxi 9 2.40 4 5 
Shanxi(Taiyuan) 8 2.13 6 2 
Sub-total  87 23.20 49 (56%) 38 (44%) 
 
 
 
 
Western 
region 
Neimenggu 7 1.87 2 5 
Sichuan 13 3.47 6 7 
Chongqing 12 3.2 8 4 
Shanxi (Xi’an) 9 2.40 7 2 
Guizhou 7 1.87 3 4 
Gansu 7 1.87 6 1 
Yuannan 6 1.60 4 2 
Ningxia 6 1.60 3 3 
Guangxi 5 1.33 5 0 
Qinghai 5 1.33 3 2 
Xinjiang  11 2.93 5 6 
Xizang 4 1.07 1 3 
Sub-total   92 24.50 53 (58%) 39 (42%) 
   Total (all provinces) 375 100% 190 (51%) 185 (49%) 
Section B: Distribution by industry 
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 Number of firms Percentage (%) 
Medicine 54 14.40 
General machinery 36 9.60 
Specialised machinery 46 12.20 
Electrical appliances 34 9.10 
Communication and computers 48 12.80 
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Table 2   
Definitions of variables 
 Definition 
Dependent variable  
Innovation performance Log (1+ ratio of new product sales to total sales x 100) 
Independent variable  
Academic collaboration Ratio of expenditure on collaboration with universities and institutes to total R&D expenditure 
Moderators  
IPR enforcement Ratio of accumulated ratio of closed IPR cases to the total number of legal IPR cases entertained 
International openness Ratio of amount of foreign direct investment to GDP in a given region calculated by Fan et al.(2010) 
Research quality of URIs Average number of academic papers published in international journals per academic in a given region 
  
Control variables  
Firm size Log (number of employees) 
Firm age Number of years since establishment or restructuring 
R&D intensity Ratio of R&D expenditure to number of employees in total 
Overseas R&D Dummy, equals to 1 if the company builds R&D center overseas 
Patent stock Log (1+ number of stock patents) 
Diversification Dummy, equals to 1 if the company operates in at least 2 two-digital industries 
State ownership Dummy, equals to 1 if share of state-owned assets is more than 50 percent 
Industry dummies Five dummies, equal to 1 if affiliated at the 5 two-digit industries (for details see Table 1) 
Year dummies Three Dummies, equal to 1 if associated with the corresponding year 
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   Table 3   
   Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Innovation performance 3.585 1.006 1.000            
2. Academic collaboration 0.110 0.156 -0.057  1.000           
3. IPR enforcement 0.890 0.070 -0.151  -0.013  1.000          
4. International openness 3.720 2.347 0.037  -0.071  0.105  1.000         
5. Research quality of URIs 0.169 0.149 -0.023  -0.066  0.279  0.376  1.000        
6. Firm size 7.847 1.651 -0.009  -0.184  0.087  -0.008  0.217  1.000       
7. Firm age 14.048 9.319 0.007  -0.110  -0.023  0.078  0.077  0.303  1.000      
8. R&D intensity 4.377 7.909 0.031  -0.056  0.015  0.043  0.040  0.007  -0.030  1.000     
9. Overseas R&D 0.107 0.309 0.054  -0.081  0.022  -0.010  0.033  0.194  0.110  -0.001  1.000    
10. Patent stock 4.410 1.657 0.127  -0.181  0.087  0.112  0.300  0.676  0.275  0.025  0.188  1.000   
11. Diversification 0.196 0.397 -0.084  -0.049  0.012  0.109  0.035  0.211  0.097  0.039  0.033  0.094  1.000  
12. State ownership 0.506 0.500 -0.091  -0.079  0.032  -0.073  0.157  0.320  -0.007  -0.005  -0.051  0.211  -0.056  
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Table 4 
Regression Results (Random effects) 
Dependent variables Innovation performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Control variables       
Firm size -0.025 -0.032 -0.033 -0.031 -0.031 -0.030 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Firm age 2.57E10-4 -2.35E10-5 -8.68E10-4 1.19E10-5 1.65E10-4 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
R&D intensity 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Overseas R&D 0.107 0.097 0.101 0.094 0.091 0.100 
 (0.129) (0.127) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) (0.125) 
Patent stock 0.079** 0.081** 0.095*** 0.081** 0.092*** 0.097*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Diversification -0.205** -0.217** -0.209** -0.218** -0.222** -0.211** 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.089) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090) 
State ownership -0.289*** -0.280*** -0.277*** -0.281*** -0.271*** -0.267*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variables        
Academic collaboration  1.373*** 0.548* 0.593* 0.622** 0.516* 
  (0.426) (0.299) (0.302) (0.302) (0.299) 
Academic collaboration squared  -3.273*** -2.905*** -2.901*** -3.070*** -2.651*** 
  (0.649) (0.647) (0.660) (0.657) (0.657) 
IPR enforcement   -1.879***   -1.814** 
   (0.564)   (0.582) 
International openness    0.010  0.020 
    (0.017)  (0.018) 
Research quality of URIs     -0.367 -0.278 
     (0.296) (0.320) 
Interactions       
Academic collaboration x IPR enforcement   10.986***   10.584*** 
   (2.247)   (2.336) 
Academic collaboration x International Openness    0.191***  0.168** 
    (0.067)  (0.073) 
Academic collaboration x Research quality of URIs     2.178*** -0.585 
     (1.167) (1.311) 
Cons 3.418*** 3.424*** 3.506*** 3.538*** 3.486*** 3.478*** 
 (0.229) (0.242) (0.226) (0.228) (0.231) (0.228) 
Observations 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125 
Wald chi2 test 66.09*** 102.78*** 138.84*** 111.83*** 108.64*** 146.65*** 
Log likelihood function -1470 -1452 -1436 -1448 -1450 -1432 
Left or right censored 59 59 59 59 59 59 
F test w.r.t. pooled Tobit 246.84*** 257.47*** 257.88*** 260.62*** 258.16*** 259.66*** 
Rho 0.500 0.511 0.511 0.514 0.512 0.514 
Hansen J test  to be filled 3.413 4.496 4.314 3.576 8.700 
Dubin-Wu-Hausman  to be filled 2.437 6.093 5.139 7.789* 8.055 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
42 
Table 4A 
Regression results (Bootstrap method) 
Dependent variables Innovation performance 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables       
Academic collaboration 1.373** 0.548 0.593* 0.622* 0.516* 
 (0.638) (0.352) (0.318) (0.358) (0.304) 
Academic collaboration squared -3.273** -2.905*** -2.901*** -3.070*** -2.651*** 
 (1.268) (1.120) (1.005) (1.101) (0.998) 
IPR protection  -1.879***   -1.814** 
  (0.639)   (0.736) 
International openness   0.010  0.020 
   (0.015)  (0.018) 
Research quality of universities    -0.367 -0.278 
    (0.313) (0.332) 
Interactions      
Academic collaboration x IPR enforcement  10.986***   10.584*** 
  (3.885)   (4.028) 
Academic collaboration x International Openness   0.191*  0.168* 
   (0.099)  (0.096) 
Academic collaboration x Research quality of URIs    2.178 -0.585 
    (1.486) (1.605) 
Cons 3.424*** 3.506*** 3.538*** 3.486*** 3.478*** 
 (0.237) (0.284) (0.254) (0.232) (0.265) 
Observations 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125 
Wald chi2 test 80.10*** 85.12*** 84.80*** 82.38*** 93.43*** 
Log likelihood function -1452 -1436 -1448 -1450 -1432 
Left or right censored 59 59 59 59 59 
F test w.r.t. pooled Tobit 257.47*** 257.88*** 260.62*** 258.16*** 259.66*** 
Rho 0.511 0.511 0.514 0.512 0.514 
Hansen J test for over-identification 3.413     
Dubin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity  2.437 6.093 5.139 7.789* 8.055 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. All control variables are included but not reported here for terseness. * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
